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Abstract
Twenty-nine teams involving 61 analysts used the same data set to address the same research question: whether 
soccer referees are more likely to give red cards to dark-skin-toned players than to light-skin-toned players. Analytic 
approaches varied widely across the teams, and the estimated effect sizes ranged from 0.89 to 2.93 (Mdn = 1.31) 
in odds-ratio units. Twenty teams (69%) found a statistically significant positive effect, and 9 teams (31%) did not 
observe a significant relationship. Overall, the 29 different analyses used 21 unique combinations of covariates. Neither 
analysts’ prior beliefs about the effect of interest nor their level of expertise readily explained the variation in the 
outcomes of the analyses. Peer ratings of the quality of the analyses also did not account for the variability. These 
findings suggest that significant variation in the results of analyses of complex data may be difficult to avoid, even 
by experts with honest intentions. Crowdsourcing data analysis, a strategy in which numerous research teams are 
recruited to simultaneously investigate the same research question, makes transparent how defensible, yet subjective, 
analytic choices influence research results.
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In the scientific process, creativity is mostly associated 
with the generation of testable hypotheses and the 
development of suitable research designs. Data analy-
sis, on the other hand, is sometimes seen as the 
mechanical, unimaginative process of revealing results 
from a research study. Despite methodologists’ remon-
strations (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Gelman 
& Loken, 2014; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), 
it is easy to overlook the fact that results may depend 
on the chosen analytic strategy, which itself is imbued 
with theory, assumptions, and choice points. In many 
cases, there are many reasonable (and many unreason-
able) approaches to evaluating data that bear on a 
research question (Carp, 2012a, 2012b; Gelman & 
Loken, 2014; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van 
der Maas, & Kievit, 2012).
Researchers may understand this conceptually, but 
there is little appreciation for the implications in prac-
tice. In some cases, authors use a particular analytic 
strategy because it is the one they know how to use, 
rather than because they have a specific rationale for 
using it. Peer reviewers may comment on and suggest 
improvements to a chosen analytic strategy, but rarely 
do those comments emerge from working with the 
actual data set (Sakaluk, Williams, & Biernat, 2014). 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for peer reviewers to 
take the authors’ analytic strategy for granted and com-
ment exclusively on other aspects of the manuscript. 
More important, once an article is published, reanalyses 
and critiques of the chosen analytic strategy are slow 
to emerge and rare (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Krumholz & 
Peterson, 2014; McCullough, McGeary, & Harrison, 
2006), in part because of the low frequency with which 
data are available for reanalysis (Wicherts, Borsboom, 
Kats, & Molenaar, 2006). The reported results and 
implications drive the impact of published articles; the 
analytic strategy is pushed to the background.
But what if the methodologists are correct? What if 
scientific results are highly contingent on subjective 
decisions at the analysis stage? In that case, the process 
of certifying a particular result on the basis of an idio-
syncratic analytic strategy might be fraught with unrec-
ognized uncertainty (Gelman & Loken, 2014), and 
research findings might be less trustworthy than they 
at first appear to be (Cumming, 2014). Had the authors 
made different assumptions, an entirely different result 
might have been observed (Babtie, Kirk, & Stumpf, 
2014). In this article, we report an investigation that 
addressed the current lack of knowledge about how 
much diversity in analytic choice there can be when 
different researchers analyze the same data and whether 
such diversity results in different conclusions. Specifi-
cally, we report the impact of analytic decisions on 
research results obtained by 29 teams that analyzed the 
same data set to answer the same research question. 
The results of this project illustrate how researchers can 
vary in their analytic approaches and how results can 
vary according to these analytic choices.
Crowdsourcing Data Analysis: Skin 
Tone and Red Cards in Soccer
The primary research question tested in this crowd-
sourced project was whether soccer players with dark 
skin tone are more likely than those with light skin tone 
to receive red cards from referees.1 The decision to give 
a player a red card results in the player’s ejection from 
the game and has severe consequences because it 
obliges his team to continue with one fewer player for 
the remainder of the match. Red cards are given for 
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aggressive behavior, such as a tackling violently, fouling 
with the intent to deny an opponent a clear goal-scoring 
opportunity, hitting or spitting on an opposing player, 
or using threatening and abusive language. However, 
despite a standard set of rules and guidelines for both 
players and match officials, referees’ decision making 
is often fraught with ambiguity (e.g., it may not be 
obvious whether a player committed an intentional foul 
or was simply going for the ball). It is inherently a 
judgment call on the part of the referee as to whether 
a player’s behavior merits a red card.
One might anticipate that players with darker skin 
tone would receive more red cards because of expec-
tancy effects in social perception: Ambiguous behavior 
tends to be interpreted in line with prior attitudes and 
beliefs (Bodenhausen, 1988; Correll, Park, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2002; Frank & Gilovich, 1988; Hugenberg 
& Bodenhausen, 2003). In societies as diverse as India, 
China, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Jamaica, the 
Philippines, the United States, Chile, Kenya, and Senegal, 
light skin is seen as a sign of beauty, status, and social 
worth (Maddox & Chase, 2004; Maddox & Gray, 2002; 
Sidanius, Pena, & Sawyer, 2001; Twine, 1998). Negative 
attitudes toward persons with dark skin may lead a ref-
eree to interpret an ambiguous foul by such a person as 
a severe foul and, consequently, to give a red card (Kim 
& King, 2014; Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, & Hamermesh, 
2011; Price & Wolfers, 2010).
Consider for a moment how you would test this 
research hypothesis using a complex archival data set 
including referees’ decisions across numerous leagues, 
games, years, referees, and players and a variety of 
potentially relevant control variables that you might or 
might not include in your analysis. Would you treat 
each red-card decision as an independent observation? 
How would you address the possibility that some ref-
erees give more red cards than others? Would you try 
to control for the seniority of the referee? Would you 
take into account whether a referee’s familiarity with a 
player affects the referee’s likelihood of assigning a red 
card? Would you look at whether players in some 
leagues are more likely to receive red cards compared 
with players in other leagues, and whether the propor-
tion of players with dark skin varies across leagues and 
player positions? As these questions suggest, many ana-
lytic decisions are required. Moreover, for a given ques-
tion, different decisions might be defensible and 
simultaneously have implications for the findings 
observed and the conclusions drawn. You and another 
researcher might make different judgment calls (regard-
ing statistical method, covariates included, or exclusion 
rules) that, prima facie, are equally valid. This crowd-
sourced project examined the extent to which such 
good faith, subjective choices by different researchers 
analyzing a complex data set shape the reported results.
Disclosures
Data, materials, and online resources
Further information on this study is available online as 
a project on the Open Science Framework (OSF). Table 
1 provides an overview of the materials from each proj-
ect stage that are available at OSF. The project’s main 
folder at OSF (https://osf.io/gvm2z) provides links to all 
files, which include the data set (https://osf.io/fv8c3/) 
and a description of the included variables (https://osf 
.io/9yh4x/), a numeric overview of results by the various 
teams at the various project stages (https://osf.io/
c9mkx/), graphical overviews of results at the various 
stages (https://osf.io/j2zth/), and the scripts to obtain 
each plot (https://osf.io/rgqtx/). The main folder also 
includes the manuscript for this article and a subarticle 
by each team detailing its analysis (https://osf.io/qix4g/).
The Supplemental Material available online (http://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/2515245 
917747646) includes a project description, notes on the 
research process, and the complete text of the surveys 
sent to the analysis teams. Further, the Supplemental 
Material documents the analytic approach taken by 
each team and indicates how these approaches were 
altered on the basis of peer feedback. In addition, the 
Supplemental Material includes an overview of results 
for the primary research question as well as additional 
analyses (including results for a second research 
Table 1. Materials Available Online
Project stage and resource URL
Stage 1  
Project page https://osf.io/gvm2z/
Codebook https://osf.io/9yh4x/
Stage 3  
Survey for teams to report their 
analytic approach
https://osf.io/yug9r/
Summary of each team’s analytic 
approach
https://osf.io/3ifm2/
Stage 4  
Survey evaluating teams’ analytic 
strategies
https://osf.io/evfts/
Round-robin feedback from the 
survey (in Qualtrics survey-
software format)
https://osf.io/ic634/
Stage 5  
Report of all analyses https://osf.io/qix4g
Stage 6a  
E-mail discussion of the analytic 
approaches
https://osf.io/8eg94/
Discussion on the appropriateness 
of the covariates
https://osf.io/2prib/
Stage 7  
Instructions for the peer evaluation https://osf.io/8e7du/
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question that initially was part of this project but was 
not pursued further because the raw data were inad-
equate). The Supplemental Material also discusses the 
limitations of the data set and of including player’s club 
and league country as covariates and provides a link 
to an IPython notebook illustrating one team’s analysis. 
Finally, the Supplemental Material includes the text of 
the survey of the analysts’ familiarity with the different 
statistical techniques used and the survey of their assess-
ment of other teams’ analytic choices, as well as results 
of an exploratory analysis undertaken to determine 
whether convergence regarding the results obtained 
depended on the analytic approach taken.
Ethical approval
This research was conducted using publicly available 
archival data and according to ethical standards.
Stages of the Crowdsourcing Process
The project unfolded over several key stages. First, the 
unique data set used for this project was obtained, 
documented, and prepared for dissemination to partici-
pating analysts (Stage 1). Then, analysts were recruited 
to participate in the project (Stage 2). The first round 
of data analysis (Stage 3) was followed by round-robin 
peer evaluations of each analysis (Stage 4). The second 
round of data analysis (Stage 5) was followed by an 
initial discussion of results and debate, which led to 
further analyses (Stage 6a). When we tried to decide 
on a common conclusion while writing, editing, and 
reviewing the manuscript (Stage 6b), further questions 
emerged, and an internal peer review was started. In 
this review, each team’s approach was evaluated by 
other analysts who were experts in that technique 
(Stage 7). The project then concluded with revision of 
this manuscript. During several of these stages, the 
analysts’ subjective beliefs about the hypothesis being 
tested were assessed using questionnaires. The timeline 
of the project is summarized in Figure 1.
Stage 1: building the data set
From a company for sports statistics, we obtained 
demographic information on all soccer players (N = 
2,053) who played in the first male divisions of England, 
Germany, France, and Spain in the 2012–2013 season. 
In addition, we obtained data about the interactions of 
those players with all referees (N = 3,147) whom they 
encountered across their professional careers. Thus, the 
interaction data for most players covered multiple sea-
sons of play, from their first professional match until 
the time that the data were acquired, in June 2014. For 
players who were new in the 2012–2013 season, the 
data covered a single season. The data included the 
number of matches in which each player encountered 
each referee and our dependent variable, the number 
of red cards given to each player by each referee. The 
data set was made available as a list with 146,028 dyads 
of players and referees.
Photos for 1,586 of the 2,053 players were available 
from our source. Players for whom no photo was avail-
able tended to be relatively new players or those who 
had just moved up from a team in a lower league. The 
variable player’s skin tone was coded by two indepen-
dent raters blind to the research question. On the basis 
of the photos, the raters categorized the players on a 
5-point scale ranging from 1 (very light skin) to 3 (nei-
ther dark nor light skin) to 5 (very dark skin), and these 
Project 
Stage Work Package
Month
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Building the Data Set                    
2 Recruitment and Initial Survey 
of Data Analysts
                   
3 First Round of Data Analysis                    
4 Round-Robin Peer Evaluations                    
5 Second Round of Data Analysis                    
6a Open Discussion and Debate, 
Further Analyses
                   
6b Write-Up of Manuscript                    
7 Internal Experts’ Peer Review 
of Approaches
                   
 Revision of Manuscript                    
Fig. 1. Overview of the project’s stages.
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ratings correlated highly (r = .92, ρ = .86). This variable 
was rescaled to be bounded by 0 (very light skin) and 
1 (very dark skin) prior to the final analysis, to ensure 
consistency of effect sizes across the teams of analysts. 
The raw ratings were rescaled to 0, .25, .50, .75, and 1 
to create this new scale.
A variety of potential independent variables were 
included in the data set (for the complete codebook, 
see https://osf.io/9yh4x). The data included players’ 
typical position, weight, and height and referees’ coun-
try of origin. For each dyad, the data included the num-
ber of games in which the referee and player encountered 
each other and the number of yellow and red cards 
awarded to the player. The records indicated players’ 
ages, clubs, and leagues—which frequently change 
throughout players’ careers—at the time of data collec-
tion, not at the specific times the red cards were received 
(see Table 2 for a summary of some of the player vari-
ables). Given the sensitivity of the research topic, ref-
erees’ identities were protected by anonymization; each 
referee and each country of referees’ origin was assigned 
a numerical identifier. Our archival data set provided 
the opportunity to estimate the magnitude of the rela-
tionship between player’s skin tone and number of red 
cards received, but did not offer the opportunity to 
identify causal relations between these variables.
Stage 2: recruitment and initial 
survey of data analysts
The first three authors and last author posted a descrip-
tion of the project online (see Supplement 1 in the 
Supplemental Material available online). This document 
included an overview of the crowdsourcing project, a 
description of the data set, and the planned timeline. 
The project was advertised via Brian Nosek’s Twitter 
account, blogs of prominent academics, and word of 
mouth.
Seventy-seven researchers expressed initial interest 
in participating and were given access to the OSF proj-
ect page to obtain the data. Individual analysts were 
welcome to form teams, and most did. For the sake of 
consistency, in this article we use the term team also 
for those few individuals who chose to work on their 
own. Thirty-three teams submitted a report in the first 
round (Stage 3), and 29 teams submitted a final report. 
The analysis presented in this article focuses on the 
submissions of those 29 teams. In total, the final project 
involved 61 data analysts plus the four authors who 
organized the project. A demographic survey revealed 
that the team leaders worked in 13 different countries 
and came from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, 
including psychology, statistics, research methods, 
economics, sociology, linguistics, and management. At 
the time that the first draft of this manuscript was writ-
ten, 38 of the 61 data analysts (62%) held a Ph.D. (62%), 
and 17 (28%) had a master’s degree. The analysts came 
from various ranks and included 8 full professors (13%), 
9 associate professors (15%), 13 assistant professors 
(21%), 8 postdocs (13%), and 17 doctoral students 
(28%). In addition, 27 participants (44%) had taught at 
least one undergraduate statistics course, 22 (36%) had 
taught at least one graduate statistics course, and 24 
(39%) had published at least one methodological or 
statistical article.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Some of the Player 
Variables
Variable Statistic
Height (cm) M = 181.74 (SD = 6.69)
Weight (kg) M = 75.64 (SD = 7.10)
Number of games M = 71.13 (SD = 36.17)
Number of yellow cards M = 27.41 (SD = 24.08)
Number of red cards M = 0.89 (SD = 1.26)
League country  
 England  n = 564 players
 France n = 533 players
 Germany n = 489 players
 Spain n = 467 players
Skin color
 0 (very light skin) Rater 1: n = 626 players
Rater 2: n = 451 players
 .25 Rater 1: n = 551 players
Rater 2: n = 693 players
 .50 Rater 1: n = 170 players
Rater 2: n = 174 players
 .75 Rater 1: n = 140 players
Rater 2: n = 141 players
 1 (very dark skin) Rater 1: n = 98 players
Rater 2: n = 126 players
 Not available Rater 1: n = 468 players
Rater 2: n = 468 players
Player position  
 Attacking midfielder n = 149 players
 Center back n = 281 players
 Center forward n = 227 players
 Center midfielder n = 84 players
 Defensive midfielder n = 204 players
 Goalkeeper n = 196 players
 Left fullback n = 136 players
 Left midfielder n = 86 players
 Left winger n = 59 players
 Not available n = 367 players
 Right fullback n = 126 players
 Right midfielder n = 75 players
 Right winger n = 63 players
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In addition to collecting data on the analysts’ demo-
graphic characteristics, we asked the team leaders for 
their opinion regarding the research question. For 
example, using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (very 
unlikely) to 5 (very likely), they answered the question 
“How likely do you think it is that soccer referees tend 
to give more red cards to dark-skinned players?” This 
question was asked again at several points in the 
research project to track beliefs over time: when ana-
lysts submitted their analytic approach, when they sub-
mitted their final analyses, and after the group discussion 
of all the teams’ results.
Stage 3: first round of data analysis
After registering and answering the subjective-beliefs 
survey for the first time, the research teams were given 
access to the data. Each team then decided on its own 
analytic approach to test the primary research question 
and analyzed the data independently of the other teams 
(see Item 1 in Supplement 2 for further details). Then, 
via a standardized Qualtrics survey, the teams submitted 
to the coordinators structured summaries of their ana-
lytic approach, including information about data trans-
formations, exclusions, covariates, the statistical 
techniques used, the software used, and the results (see 
Supplement 3 for the text of the survey materials sent 
to the team leaders; the Qualtrics files and descriptions 
of the individual teams’ analytic approaches are avail-
able at https://osf.io/yug9r/ and https://osf.io/3ifm2/, 
respectively). The teams were also asked about their 
beliefs regarding the primary research question.
Stage 4: round-robin peer evaluations 
of overall analysis quality
For the first three stages of the project, the teams were 
expected to work independently of each other. How-
ever, beginning with Stage 4, they were encouraged to 
discuss and debate their respective approaches to the 
data set. In Stage 4, after descriptions of the results were 
removed, the structured summaries were collated into 
a single questionnaire and distributed to all the teams 
for peer review. The analytic approaches were presented 
in a random order, and the analysts were instructed to 
provide feedback on at least the first three approaches 
that they examined. They were asked to provide qualita-
tive feedback as well as a confidence rating (“How con-
fident are you that the described approach below is 
suitable for analyzing the research questions?”) on a 
7-point scale from 1 (unconfident) to 7 (confident). On 
average, each team received feedback from about five 
other teams (M = 5.32, SD = 2.87).
The qualitative and quantitative feedback was aggre-
gated into a single report and shared with all team mem-
bers. Thus, each team received peer-review commentaries 
about their own analytic strategy and the other teams’ 
analytic strategies. Notably, these commentaries came 
from reviewers who were highly familiar with the data 
set, yet at this point the teams were unaware of others’ 
results (for the complete survey and round-robin feed-
back, see https://osf.io/evfts/ and https://osf.io/ic634/, 
respectively). Each team therefore had the opportunity 
to learn from others’ analytic approaches and from the 
qualitative and quantitative feedback provided by peer 
reviewers, but did not have access to other teams’ esti-
mated effect sizes. This phase offered the teams an 
opportunity to improve the quality of their analyses and, 
if anything, ought to have promoted convergence in 
analytic strategies and outcomes.
Stage 5: second round of data analysis
Following the peer review, the teams had the opportu-
nity to change their analytic strategies and draw new 
conclusions (see Supplement 4 for a list of the initial 
and final approaches of each team). They submitted 
formal reports in a standardized format and also filled 
out a standardized questionnaire similar to that used in 
Stage 2. Their subjective beliefs about the primary 
research question were also assessed in this question-
naire. Notably, the teams were not forced to present a 
single effect size without robustness checks. Rather, 
they were encouraged to present results in the way they 
would in a published article, with formal Method and 
Results sections. Some teams adopted a model-building 
approach and reported the results of the model that 
they felt was the most appropriate one. The fact that 
not every team did this represents yet another subjec-
tive, yet defensible analytic choice. All the teams’ 
reports are available on the OSF, at https://osf.io/qix4g. 
Supplement 5 presents a brief summary of each team’s 
methods and a one-sentence description of each team’s 
findings, and Supplement 11 provides an illustration of 
one team’s process.
Stage 6: open discussion and debate, 
further analyses, and drafting a 
report on the project
After the formal analysis, the reports were compiled and 
uploaded to the OSF project. A summary e-mail sent to 
all the teams invited them to review the reports and 
discuss as a group the analytic strategies and what to 
conclude regarding the primary research question. Team 
members engaged in a substantive e-mail discussion 
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regarding the variation in findings and analytic strategies 
(the full text of this discussion can be found at https://
osf.io/8eg94/). For example, one team found a strong 
influence of five outliers on their results. Other teams 
performed additional analyses to investigate whether 
their results were similarly driven by a few outliers 
(interestingly, they were not). Limitations of the data set 
were also discussed (see Supplement 9). At this stage, 
a final assessment of subjective beliefs was conducted; 
this survey also presented a series of possible statements 
summarizing the outcome of this project and asked the 
analysts to rate their agreement with each one. The first 
three authors and last author then wrote a first draft of 
this manuscript, and all the team members were invited 
to jointly edit and extend the draft using Google Docs.
When the analysts scrutinized each other’s results, it 
became apparent that differences in results may have 
been due not only to variations in statistical models, but 
also to variations in the choice of covariates. Doing a 
preliminary reanalysis, the leader of Team 10 discovered 
that including league and club as covariates may have 
been responsible for the nonsignificant results obtained 
by some teams. A debate emerged regarding whether 
the inclusion of these covariates was quantitatively 
defensible given that the data on league and club were 
available for the time of data collection only and these 
variables likely changed over the course of many players’ 
careers (see the discussion at https://osf.io/2prib/). The 
project coordinators therefore asked the 10 teams that 
had included these variables in their final models to 
rerun their models without these covariates (see Supple-
ment 10). Additionally, these teams were allowed to 
decide whether they wanted to revise their final models 
to exclude these covariates.2 The results reported in this 
article reflect the teams’ choices of their final models.
Stage 7: more granular peer 
assessments of analysis quality
The discussion and debate about analytic choices moti-
vated the project coordinators to initiate a more fine-
grained assessment of each of the final analyses to 
identify potential flaws that might account for any vari-
ability in the reported results. Therefore, after the meth-
ods and results of all the teams were known, the 
analysts participated in an additional internal peer-
review assessment. First, they indicated their familiarity 
with each approach used by each team, on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (very unfamiliar) to 5 (very famil-
iar; see Supplement 12). For some techniques, most of 
the analysts responded “familiar” or “very familiar” (e.g., 
34 in the case of multiple regression). For other tech-
niques, relatively few analysts did so (e.g., 3 in the case 
of Bayesian clustering with the Dirichlet process). On 
the basis of their expertise, the coordinators then 
assigned each analyst one to three analytic strategies 
to assess in greater depth (i.e., strategies involving tech-
niques that the analyst reported being familiar or very 
familiar with). No researcher was assigned to review 
the approach of his or her own team.
From comments the analysts made in the earlier 
rounds of analysis (Stages 3–6), the coordinators 
derived a list of seven potential statistical concerns 
regarding analytic decisions that were made (see Sup-
plement 13). For example, an analysis may have unnec-
essarily excluded a large number of cases or may not 
have adequately accounted for the number of games 
played. The analysts were asked to report whether the 
assigned analytic strategies had failed to take into 
account each of these seven issues (on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree). 
Note that lower scores indicated that more obstacles 
were avoided, and higher scores indicated that more 
issues were left unaddressed. For each assigned strat-
egy, the survey also included an open-ended question 
asking whether there was an additional analytic issue 
that might have biased the results, and another item 
asked the analysts to rate their agreement that this 
additional issue affected the validity of the approach 
(same 5-point scale). The final question asked the ana-
lysts to rate how convinced they were that the approach 
in question successfully addressed most of the potential 
statistical concerns (1= very unconvinced, 5 = very 
convinced).
Main Findings From the Project
How much did results vary between 
different teams using the same data to 
test the same hypothesis?
Table 3 shows each team’s final analytic technique, 
model specifications for treatment of nonindependence, 
and reported effect size.3 The analytic techniques cho-
sen ranged from simple linear regression to complex 
multilevel regression and Bayesian approaches. The 
teams also varied greatly in their decisions regarding 
which covariates to include (see https://osf.io/sea6k/ 
for the rationales the teams provided). Table 4 shows 
that the 29 teams used 21 unique combinations of 
covariates. Apart from the variable games (i.e., the num-
ber of games played under a given referee, which was 
used by all the teams, just one covariate (player posi-
tion, 69%) was used in more than half of the teams’ 
analyses, and three were used in just one analysis. 
Three teams chose to use no covariates, and another 3 
teams included player position as the only covariate in 
their analysis. Four sets of variables were used by 2 
teams each, and each of the remaining 15 teams used 
a unique combination of covariates.
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What were the consequences of this 
variability in analytic approaches?
Figure 2 shows each team’s estimated effect size, along 
with its 95% confidence interval (CI). As this figure and 
Table 3 show, the estimated effect sizes ranged from 
0.89 (slightly negative) to 2.93 (moderately positive) in 
odds-ratio (OR) units; the median estimate was 1.31. 
The confidence intervals for many of the estimates 
overlap, which is expected because they are based on 
Table 3. Analytic Approaches and Results for Each Team
Team Distribution
Treatment of  
nonindependence
Number of 
covariates Analytic approach OR
 1 Linear Clustered standard errors 7 Ordinary least squares regression 
with robust standard errors, logistic 
regression
1.18 [0.95, 1.41]
 6 Linear Clustered standard errors 6 Linear probability model 1.28 [0.77, 2.13]
14 Linear Clustered standard errors 6 Weighted least squares regression with 
clustered standard errors
1.21 [0.97, 1.46]
 4 Linear None 3 Spearman correlation 1.21 [1.20, 1.21]
11 Linear None 4 Multiple linear regression 1.25 [1.05, 1.49]
10 Linear Variance component 3 Multilevel regression and logistic 
regression
1.03 [1.01, 1.05]
 2 Logistic Clustered standard errors 6 Linear probability model, logistic 
regression
1.34 [1.10, 1.63]
30 Logistic Clustered standard errors 3 Clustered robust binomial logistic 
regression
1.28 [1.04, 1.57]
31 Logistic Clustered standard errors 6 Logistic regression 1.12 [0.88, 1.43]
32 Logistic Clustered standard errors 1 Generalized linear models for binary 
data
1.39 [1.10, 1.75]
 8 Logistic None 0 Negative binomial regression with a 
log link
1.39 [1.17, 1.65]
15 Logistic None 1 Hierarchical log-linear modeling 1.02 [1.00, 1.03]
 3 Logistic Variance component 2 Multilevel logistic regression using 
Bayesian inference
1.31 [1.09, 1.57]
 5 Logistic Variance component 0 Generalized linear mixed models 1.38 [1.10, 1.75]
 9 Logistic Variance component 2 Generalized linear mixed-effects 
models with a logit link
1.48 [1.20, 1.84]
17 Logistic Variance component 2 Bayesian logistic regression 0.96 [0.77, 1.18]
18 Logistic Variance component 2 Hierarchical Bayes model 1.10 [0.98, 1.27]
23 Logistic Variance component 2 Mixed-model logistic regression 1.31 [1.10, 1.56]
24 Logistic Variance component 3 Multilevel logistic regression 1.38 [1.11, 1.72]
25 Logistic Variance component 4 Multilevel logistic binomial regression 1.42 [1.19, 1.71]
28 Logistic Variance component 2 Mixed-effects logistic regression 1.38 [1.12, 1.71]
21 Miscellaneous Clustered standard errors 3 Tobit regression 2.88 [1.03, 11.47]
 7 Miscellaneous None 0 Dirichlet-process Bayesian clustering 1.71 [1.70, 1.72]
12 Poisson Fixed effect 2 Zero-inflated Poisson regression 0.89 [0.49, 1.60]
27 Poisson None 1 Poisson regression 2.93 [0.11, 78.66]
13 Poisson Variance component 1 Poisson multilevel modeling 1.41 [1.13, 1.75]
16 Poisson Variance component 2 Hierarchical Poisson regression 1.32 [1.06, 1.63]
20 Poisson Variance component 1 Cross-classified multilevel negative 
binomial model
1.40 [1.15, 1.71]
26 Poisson Variance component 6 Hierarchical generalized linear 
modeling with Poisson sampling
1.30 [1.08, 1.56]
Note: Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Each team’s observed effect size is presented in this table as an odds ratio, but some of the 
teams reported effect sizes in other units that were converted to odds ratios. Those originally reported effect sizes are as follows—Team 4: Cohen’s d = 
0.10, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.10]; Team 11: Cohen’s d = 0.12, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.22]; Team 10: β = 0.01, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.01]; Team 21: β = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.01, 
0.56]; Team 12: incidental risk ratio (IRR) = 0.89, 95% CI = [0.49, 1.60]; Team 27: IRR = 2.93, 95% CI = [0.11, 78.66]; Team 13: IRR = 1.41, 95% CI = [1.13, 
1.75]; Team 16: IRR = 1.32, 95% CI = [1.06, 1.63]; Team 20: IRR = 1.40, 95% CI = [1.15, 1.71]; Team 26: IRR = 1.30, 95% CI = [1.08, 1.56].
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the same data. Twenty teams (69%) found a significant 
positive relationship, p < .05, and nine teams (31%) 
found a nonsignificant relationship. No team reported 
a significant negative relationship.
What were the results obtained 
with the different types of analytic 
approaches used?
Teams that employed logistic or Poisson models tended 
to report estimates that were larger than those of teams 
that used linear models (see the effect sizes in Fig. 3, 
in which the teams are clustered according to the dis-
tribution used for analyses). Fifteen teams used logistic 
models, and 11 of these teams found a significant effect 
(median OR = 1.34; median absolution deviation, or 
MAD = 0.07). Six teams used Poisson models, and 4 of 
these teams found a significant effect (median OR = 
1.36, MAD = 0.08). Of the 6 teams that used linear 
models, 3 found a significant effect (median OR = 1.21, 
MAD = 0.05). The final 2 teams used models classified 
as miscellaneous, and both of these teams reported 
significant effects (ORs = 1.71 and 2.88, respectively).
The teams also varied in their approaches to han-
dling the nonindependence of players and referees, and 
this variability also influenced both median estimates 
of the effect size and the rates of significant results. In 
total, 15 teams estimated a fixed effect or variance com-
ponent for players, referees, or both; 12 of these teams 
reported significant effects (median OR = 1.32, MAD = 
0.12). Eight teams used clustered standard errors, and 
4 of these teams found significant effects (median OR = 
1.28, MAD = 0.13). An additional 5 teams did not account 
for this artifact, and 4 of these teams reported signifi-
cant effects (median OR = 1.39, MAD = 0.28). The remain-
ing team used fixed effects for the referee variable and 
reported a nonsignificant result (OR = 0.89).
Did the analysts’ beliefs regarding the 
hypothesis change over time?
Analysts’ subjective beliefs about the research hypoth-
esis were assessed four times during the project: at 
initial registration (i.e., before they had received the 
data), after they had accessed the data and submitted 
their analytic approach, at the time final analyses were 
submitted, and after a group discussion of all the teams’ 
approaches and results. Responses were centered at 0 
for analyses to increase interpretability (thus, the range 
was from −2, for very unlikely, to +2, for very likely). 
Subjective beliefs changed over time (see Fig. 4). At 
initial registration, there was slight agreement, on aver-
age, that the number of red cards was positively related 
to players’ skin tone, yet opinions varied greatly (M = 
0.46, SD = 0.84). At the next assessment, the slight initial 
agreement had turned into slight disagreement (M = 
−0.61, SD = 0.88). When the teams submitted their final 
analyses, they again slightly agreed that there was a 
relationship; the magnitude of agreement was similar 
to what it had been initially, but again there was sub-
stantial variability (M = 0.61, SD = 1.20). Finally, after 
the group discussion, overall agreement increased 
slightly, and, notably, variability decreased (M = 0.75, 
SD = 0.70), which suggests some convergence in beliefs 
over time. The right-hand plot in Figure 4 shows the 
number of teams who endorsed each level of agree-
ment at each of the four assessments. Beliefs converged 
over time, such that that toward the end of the project, 
more teams agreed that skin tone affected the number 
of red cards received.
The fourth and final survey assessed more nuanced 
beliefs about the primary research question. All the 
analysts were asked to respond individually to this sur-
vey. The new items included, for example, “The effect 
is positive and due to referee bias” and “There is little 
evidence for an effect.” The analysts responded to these 
items on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Summary statistics for this survey are 
reported in Table 5. By the end of the project, a major-
ity of the analysts agreed that the data showed a posi-
tive relationship between the number of red cards 
received and players’ skin tone but were unclear regard-
ing the underlying mechanism. The level of agreement 
was highest (78%) for the statement “The effect is posi-
tive and the mechanism is unknown” (M = 5.32, SD = 
1.47).
What was the association between 
analysts’ subjective beliefs regarding 
the hypothesis and the results 
obtained?
Of particular interest was whether subjective beliefs 
about the truth of the primary research hypothesis were 
related to the results the teams obtained. One might 
anticipate a confirmation bias, that is, that the analysts 
found what they initially expected to find. Alternatively, 
they might have rationally updated their beliefs in 
response to the empirical results they obtained, even 
if those results contradicted their initial expectations.
The team leaders’ self-reports regarding the primary 
research question at each of the four assessments of 
beliefs were correlated with the final reported effect 
size, and the magnitude of this association increased 
across time: ρ = .14, 95% CI = [−.25, .49]; ρ = −.20, 95% 
CI = [−.53, .19]; ρ = .43, 95% CI = [.07, .69]; and ρ = .41, 
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95% CI = [.04, .68], respectively. Because both the mag-
nitude of the estimated effect and the precision of the 
estimate varied by team, we also correlated the lower 
bound of the 95% CI and responses to this question 
and obtained the following correlations across the four 
time points: ρ = .29, 95% CI = [−.09, .60]; ρ = −.10, 95% 
CI = [−.46, .28]; ρ = .52, 95% CI = [.18, .75]; and ρ = .58, 
95% CI = [.26, .78], respectively.
In short, the analysts’ beliefs at registration regarding 
whether players with darker skin tone were more likely 
to receive red cards were not significantly related to 
the final effect sizes reported, but beliefs changed con-
siderably throughout the research project, and as a 
result, the analysts’ post-analysis beliefs were signifi-
cantly related to both the reported effect-size estimates 
and the lower bounds of the 95% CIs for these esti-
mates. These results suggest that there was some updat-
ing of beliefs based on the empirical results. Although 
the sample size was small (N = 29), the overall results 
are more consistent with rational updating of beliefs 
based on the evidence than with confirmation bias.
Does the analysts’ expertise explain 
the variability in results?
An important question is whether the variability in the 
analytic choices made and results found by the teams 
resulted from teams with the greatest statistical exper-
tise making different choices than the other teams. A 
related question is whether teams whose members had 
more quantitative expertise showed greater conver-
gence in their estimated effect sizes. To answer these 
questions, we dichotomized the teams into two groups 
using latent class analysis. The first group (n = 9) was 
more likely to have a team member who had a Ph.D. 
(100% vs. 53%), was a professor at a university (100% 
vs. 37%), had taught a graduate statistics course more 
than twice (100% vs. 0%), and had at least one meth-
odological or statistical publication (78% vs. 47%). 
Seventy-eight percent of the teams in this first group 
reported effects that were statistically significant 
(median OR = 1.39, MAD = 0.13), whereas 68% of the 
teams with less expertise reported a significant effect 
(median OR = 1.30, MAD = 0.13). Analyses of the effects 
of the team’s quantitative expertise on their choice of 
statistical models is provided in Supplement 6. Note, 
however, that teams in both latent classes exhibited 
considerable variability in whether they found a signifi-
cant effect, and the two classes had similar degrees of 
dispersion in their effect-size estimates. Thus, overall, 
statistical expertise may have had some influence on 
analytic approaches and estimated effect sizes, but does 
not explain the high variability in these choices or in 
the results obtained.
Do the peer ratings of overall analysis 
quality explain the variability in results?
We also examined whether the peer evaluations of the 
overall quality of each analytic approach were associ-
ated with the reported results. During the round-robin 
feedback phase, when the methods (but not results) 
for each team were known, the analysts rated their 
confidence in the suitability of other teams’ analytic 
plans. The final effect sizes reported by teams whose 
analytic approach received higher confidence ratings 
(no rating lower than 4; median OR = 1.31, MAD = 0.15) 
did not differ from the reported effect sizes of those 
teams that received lower confidence ratings (median 
OR = 1.28, MAD = 0.12). Thus, there was little evidence 
that the variability in estimated effect sizes observed 
across teams was attributable to a subset of analyses 
that were lower than the others in quality overall.
Do the peer assessments of specific 
statistical issues explain the variability 
in results?
Toward the end of the crowdsourcing process, each 
team’s final analytic approach was evaluated by other 
analysts who had particular expertise in that approach. 
These experts assessed the extent to which the assigned 
approaches addressed each of seven statistical issues 
and also rated their overall confidence in the approaches. 
Table 5. Analysts’ Mean Agreement With Potential 
Conclusions That Could Be Drawn From the Data
Conclusion Mean SD
Positive relationship likely caused by 
referee bias
3.37 1.65
Positive relationship likely caused by 
unobserved variables (e.g., players’ 
behavior)
4.21 1.37
Positive relationship but the cause is 
unknown
5.32 1.47
Positive relationship, but it is contingent 
on a relatively small number of outlier 
observations
3.18 1.31
Positive relationship, but it is contingent 
on other variables in the data set (e.g., 
differences across leagues)
3.84 1.33
Little evidence of a relationship 3.17 1.66
No relationship 2.49 1.28
Negative relationship 1.64 0.80
Note: The results shown are from the final survey. Each item 
concerned whether there is a relationship between players’ skin tone 
and the number of red-card decisions they receive. The response 
scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items 
have been paraphrased for inclusion in the table.
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On average, each approach was assessed by 2.55 
experts; 16 were reviewed by 3 experts, and 13 were 
reviewed by 2 experts. The average rating of agreement 
that statistical issues had not been addressed was 2.18 
(SD = 0.55) on a scale from 1 to 5 (lower numbers 
indicate fewer unaddressed analytic issues).
The experts tended to be more convinced by 
approaches in which fewer problematic issues remained, 
as indicated by a negative correlation between the aver-
age rating across the seven statistical issues and the 
experts’ rating of confidence (r = −.75, 95% CI = [−.60, 
−.86]). However, ratings for the analytic issues were 
unrelated to the OR for the relationship between darker 
skin tone and number of red cards received (r = .06, 
95% CI = [−.35, .31]). Likewise, experts’ overall confi-
dence in each analytic approach was unrelated to the 
OR for the relationship between skin tone and red cards 
(r = −.03, 95% CI = [−.39, .60]). Overall, analyses revealed 
relatively little evidence that analytic approaches with 
identifiable statistical problems accounted for the vari-
ability in results across teams (e.g. by producing abnor-
mally large or small effect sizes). Supplement 14 reports 
exploratory analyses aimed at determining whether 
certain kinds of analyses exhibited more convergence 
across teams than others did.
Implications for the Scientific Endeavor
It is easy to understand that effects can vary across 
independent tests of the same research hypothesis 
when different sources of data are used. Variation in 
measures and samples, as well as random error in 
assessment, naturally produce variation in results. Here, 
we have demonstrated that as a result of researchers’ 
choices and assumptions during analysis, variation in 
estimated effect sizes can emerge even when analyses 
use the same data. The independent teams’ estimated 
effects for the primary research question ranged from 
0.89 to 2.93 in OR units (1.0 indicates a null effect); no 
teams found a negative effect, 9 found no significant 
relationship, and 20 found a positive effect. If a single 
team, selected randomly from the present teams, had 
conducted the study using the same data set, there 
would have been a 69% probability of a positive esti-
mated effect size and a 31% probability of a null effect.
This variability in results cannot be readily accounted 
for by differences in expertise. Analysts with high and 
lower levels of quantitative expertise both exhibited 
high levels of variability in their estimated effect sizes. 
Further, analytic approaches that received highly favor-
able evaluations from peers showed the same variability 
in final effect sizes as did analytic approaches that were 
less favorably rated. This was true for two different 
measures of quality: peer ratings of overall quality and 
experts’ ratings of whether specific statistical issues had 
been addressed.
The problem of analysis-contingent 
results is distinct from the problems 
introduced by p-hacking, the garden 
of forking paths, and reanalyses of 
original data
The main contribution of this article is in directly dem-
onstrating the extent to which good-faith, yet subjec-
tive, analytic choices can have an impact on research 
results. This problem is related to, but distinct from, the 
problems associated with p-hacking (Simonsohn, 
Nelson, & Simmons, 2014), the garden of forking paths 
(Gelman & Loken, 2014), and reanalyses of original 
data used in published reports.
p-hacking. As originally defined by Simonsohn et  al. 
(2014), p-hacking is either consciously or unconsciously 
exploiting researcher degrees of freedom in order to 
achieve statistical significance. For instance, they wrote that 
“researchers may file merely the subsets of analyses that 
produce nonsignificant results. We refer to such behavior 
as p-hacking” (p. 534). Thus, p-hacking is driven by the 
implicit or explicit goal to obtain statistically significant 
support for a particular conclusion. Although the specific 
decisions made in the process of p-hacking may be inde-
pendently justifiable, it is not justifiable to choose an ana-
lytic strategy on the basis of whether it provides a desired 
result. Few editors would accept a manuscript, even one 
based on a series of prima facie defensible analytic choices, 
if the researchers admitted that they had made their ana-
lytic choices so as to reach the p < .05 criterion.
In the current crowdsourcing project, all the teams 
knew that their analyses would be shown to other ana-
lysts and made public, and the perceived need to 
achieve a significant result for publishability was less-
ened by the nature of the project. Although distinct 
from p-hacking, highly defensible analytic decisions 
made without direct incentives to achieve statistical 
significance can still produce wide variability in effect-
size estimates. In the case of the hypothesized relation-
ship between players’ skin tone and referees’ red-card 
decisions, the findings collectively suggest a positive 
correlation, but this can be glimpsed only through the 
fog of varying subjective analytic decisions.
The garden of forking paths. Gelman and Loken’s 
(2014) concept of a garden of forking paths focuses not 
on selection from among different analytic options in 
order to achieve significant results (as in p-hacking), but 
rather on testing for significance after patterns in the data 
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have been observed. Such data-contingent analyses do 
capitalize heavily (perhaps unintentionally) on chance, 
because patterns that emerge randomly are subjected to 
significance tests whose validity requires a priori predic-
tions. This practice leads to “researcher degrees of free-
dom without fishing, [and] consists of computing a single 
test based on the data, but in an environment where a 
different test would have been performed given different 
data” (Gelman & Loken, 2014, p. 460).
The analysis-contingent results we examined in the 
current project reveal an issue that is broader than the 
issue of forking paths: Variability in effect sizes can 
occur even when the researcher has not looked for 
patterns in the data first and tested for significance only 
after the fact. For example, the analysts were asked to 
test a specific relationship between players’ skin tone 
and referees’ red-card decisions. This arguably limited 
opportunities for a garden-of-forking-paths process, 
which might have taken the form of examining relation-
ships between players’ various group-based character-
istics (skin tone, ethnicity, per capita gross domestic 
product of country of origin), on the one hand, and 
various referee decisions (red cards, yellow cards, 
stoppage time, offside calls, disallowed goals), on the 
other, and then running formal significance tests only 
for the relationships that looked as if they might be 
meaningful.
Moreover, imagine if the 29 teams had been required 
to preregister their analysis plans before observing the 
data (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Preregistration solves 
the problems of forking paths and p-hacking by remov-
ing the flexibility of data-contingent analyses and 
reducing the opportunity to present post hoc tests as 
a priori (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). However, prereg-
istration would not have prevented the observed vari-
ability in effect-size estimates across the teams in this 
study. Outcomes can vary as a result of different, defen-
sible analytic decisions whether they are made post hoc 
or a priori.
Reanalyzing data used in published reports. Mak - 
ing data from published reports more accessible to facili-
tate reanalyses and postpublication peer review (Hunter, 
2012; Simonsohn, 2013; Wicherts et al., 2006) is important 
for science, but also does not make fully transparent the 
contingency of observed findings on analytic decisions. 
For example, few scientists would bother to write (and 
even fewer editors would publish) a commentary present-
ing new analyses and results unless they suggest a con-
clusion different from the one in the original publication. 
This creates perverse incentives for both original authors 
and commenters. Original authors have strong incentives 
to find positive results so that their work will be pub-
lished, and commenters have strong incentives to find 
different (usually negative) results for the same reason. 
Thus, published commentaries will almost inevitably dif-
fer from original articles in their analytic approaches and 
conclusions, which introduces a strong selection bias.
In contrast, when data analysis is crowdsourced prior 
to publication, any individual analysis will not play a 
major role in the final publication decision, and the 
approach is collaborative rather than conflict oriented. 
The most obvious incentive may be to avoid making a 
public error analyzing an open data set. Thus, crowd-
sourcing data analysis may reduce dysfunctional incen-
tives for both original authors and commenters, build 
connections between colleagues, and make transparent 
all approaches used and all results obtained. Crowd-
sourcing analysis can result in a much more accurate 
picture of the robustness of results and the dependency 
of the findings on subjective analytic choices.
Conclusions. In sum, our crowd of analysts had no 
incentive to try different specifications and choose one 
that supported the hypothesis (p-hacking), to first exam-
ine the data and test for significant patterns only after the 
fact (the garden of forking paths), or to confirm or dis-
confirm a finding to achieve publication. Even so, the 
variability in analytic choices led to variability in observed 
results. This illustrates the breadth of the challenge posed 
by the fact that analytic choices can influence observed 
outcomes.
How much variability in results  
is too much?
Scientists can have comparatively more faith in a finding 
when there is less variability in analytic approaches 
taken to investigating the targeted phenomenon and in 
results obtained using different methods. In a follow-up 
to this project, Crowdsourcing Data Analysis 2, a group 
of more than 40 analysts have independently analyzed 
a complex data set to test hypotheses regarding the 
effects of gender and status on intellectual debates. This 
new crowd of analysts are reporting radically dispersed 
effect sizes, and in some cases significant effects in oppo-
site directions for the same hypothesis tested with the 
same data. In such extreme cases of little to no conver-
gence in results, the crowdsourcing process suggests that 
the scientific community should have no faith that the 
hypothesis is true, even if one or two teams find signifi-
cant support with a defensible analysis—results that 
might have been publishable on their own. In the pres-
ent project on referees’ decisions, the degree of conver-
gence in results was relatively high by comparison, as 
more than two thirds of the teams found support for the 
hypothesis and the vast majority of teams obtained 
effect-size estimates in the predicted direction.
There will almost always be variability in a measured 
effect depending on analytic choices. As transparency 
Many Analysts, One Data Set 353
about this variability increases with data-posting require-
ments and additional crowdsourced projects, scientists 
and policymakers will need to make ultimately subjec-
tive decisions about how much consistency is enough 
(and not enough) to conclude an effect most likely 
exists. Similar subjective and continually debated deci-
sions have had to be made about the cutoff for statistical 
significance (Benjamin et al., 2017; Johnson, 2013). Set-
ting cutoffs may be particularly challenging for policy-
makers because it is their responsibility to make 
decisions, and the ideal information on which to base 
a decision would include both whether an effect exists 
and how large it is. For example, some economic inter-
ventions might have both societally positive and soci-
etally negative effects, and policymakers will want to 
have precise estimates of all these effects to evaluate 
the trade-offs. Policymakers and practitioners may 
require greater convergence in effect-size estimates 
than scientists, for whom establishing a directional 
effect is often sufficient for building theory. We believe 
that crowdsourcing data-analysis initiatives will help 
policymakers by improving estimation of confidence 
and uncertainty. Crowdsourced analysis, combined with 
preregistered investigations and replications, will pro-
vide more informed benchmarks regarding the contin-
gency of observed findings on characteristics of the 
sample and setting, procedures followed, and analytic 
decisions.
Generalizability to other data sets
The results of the present crowdsourced initiative are 
striking because the research question, concerning the 
relationship between players’ skin tone and referees’ 
red-card decisions, was clear and, ostensibly, straight-
forward to investigate. Compared with many research 
questions in neuroscience, economics, biology, and 
psychology, this one is of relatively modest complexity. 
And yet the process of translating this question from 
natural language to statistical models gave rise to many 
different assumptions and choices that influenced the 
conclusions. This raises the possibility that hidden 
uncertainty due to the wide range of analytic choices 
available to researchers exists across a wide variety of 
research applications.
Of course, more than one such investigation is 
needed to determine how contingent research results 
are on analytic decisions more generally. This demon-
stration is thus limited to being a case example; its 
conclusions are plausible, but have untested generaliz-
ability. For example, the project coordinators framed a 
specific research question for the analysts (Does play-
ers’ skin tone correlate with referees’ red-card deci-
sions?), which may have artificially reduced the 
variability in estimated effect sizes. The research 
question could have been posed more broadly (Is there 
evidence of bias against minority groups in referees’ 
decisions?), or the key outcome measure (e.g., number 
of yellow cards, number of red cards, stoppage time) 
could have been left up to each research team. This 
research question is being examined in Crowdsourcing 
Data Analysis 2, on the roles of gender and status in 
intellectual debates. In this follow-up project, analysts 
are also choosing how to operationalize each construct 
(e.g., is academic status best measured by citation 
counts, job rank, school rank, or some combination of 
these?). As noted earlier, the variability in effect-size 
estimates is even greater in this second project than in 
the present initiative. Systematic investigation via crowd-
sourcing will facilitate more general conclusions about 
how contingent research results are on analytic choices, 
and what characteristics of the research question, data 
set, and analyses serve as moderating variables.
There are also constraints on the useful application 
of crowdsourcing strategies. For example, the flexibility 
in analytic choices and thus their impact on estimated 
effect sizes is likely to be greatest when data sets are 
complex (e.g., longitudinal data sets with missing data, 
many potential covariates, levels of nesting). It remains 
an empirical question how contingent results are on 
analytic choices in the case of comparatively simple 
experimental studies with two to four conditions and 
few measured variables. There may still be enough 
choice points (outlier exclusions and statistical trans-
formations, such as in the case of skewed data), even 
when researchers analyze a relatively simple data set, 
to introduce considerable variability in results based 
on those choices (Steegen, Tuerlinckx, Gelman, & 
Vanpaemel, 2016).
Notably, the robustness of experimental laboratory 
effects can also be assessed via replications repeating 
the same experimental design with new research par-
ticipants (Ebersole et  al., 2016; Klein et  al., 2014). 
Crowdsourcing data analysis is particularly relevant for 
data sets that have many analytic choice points and that 
cannot easily be independently replicated with new 
observations. Crowdsourcing may also add a great deal 
of value when controversial research questions are 
being addressed or when there are many competing 
theoretical predictions to be adjudicated empirically.
Recommendations for individual 
researchers and teams
Because of practical constraints, most future scientific 
investigations will not involve crowds of researchers. 
For a lone analyst working without the benefit of a 
crowd, we recommend use of a specification curve 
(Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2016) or multiverse 
analysis (Steegen et al., 2016). With these approaches, 
354 Silberzahn et al.
the analyst in effect tries to come up with every differ-
ent defensible analysis he or she can, runs them all, 
and then computes the likelihood that the number of 
observed significant results would be seen if there 
really is no effect (Simonsohn et al., 2016).
Crowdsourcing the analysis of data has greatly 
reduced efficiency compared with attempting many 
specifications as an individual. However, when feasible, 
a crowdsourced approach adds value in a number of 
ways. A globally distributed crowdsourced project will 
leverage skills, perspectives, and approaches to data 
analysis that no single analyst or research team can 
realistically muster alone. In addition, a crowd of ana-
lysts has no perverse incentive to conduct a primary 
analysis or robustness check that produces statistically 
significant support for the research hypothesis. In con-
trast, a traditional research team seeking to publish in 
a top academic journal has a strong perverse incentive 
to select both a primary analysis and robustness checks 
that return publishable results, something that is rela-
tively easy to do given the numerous possible specifica-
tions typically available to choose from. Further, 
crowdsourcing data analysis allows for different 
research teams to discuss and debate analytic concerns 
with a richness and depth not typically seen in the 
academic review process, in which reviewers and edi-
tors rarely have access to the data themselves, and often 
choose to focus on aspects of a manuscript other than 
the analytic approach chosen.
Conclusion
The observed results from analyzing a complex data set 
can be highly contingent on justifiable, but subjective, 
analytic decisions. Uncertainty in interpreting research 
results is therefore not just a function of statistical power 
or the use of questionable research practices; it is also 
a function of the many reasonable decisions that 
researchers must make in order to conduct the research. 
This does not mean that analyzing data and drawing 
research conclusions is a subjective enterprise with no 
connection to reality. It does mean that many subjective 
decisions are part of the research process and can affect 
the outcomes. The best defense against subjectivity in 
science is to expose it. Transparency in data, methods, 
and process gives the rest of the community opportunity 
to see the decisions, question them, offer alternatives, 
and test these alternatives in further research.
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Notes
1. This project also included a second research question: 
whether country-level preferences for light versus dark skin 
predict the red-card decisions of referees from the countries 
for which we had data on such preferences. In brief, the teams 
found little to no evidence that referees’ decisions were mod-
erated by explicit or implicit skin-tone preferences. However, 
data on individual referees’ skin-tone preferences were not 
available; this variable was a measure of preferences based on 
aggregated data from referees’ nations of origin, and the major-
ity of the analysts judged the available data set to be inadequate 
to test this potential moderator. Detailed results are reported in 
Supplement 7 in the Supplemental Material available online.
2. One of the coauthors of this article, D. Molden, strongly dis-
agreed with the project coordinators’ decision to allow teams 
to choose to retain these covariates in any final analyses. He 
argued that the high rate of movement of players between clubs 
and leagues each year (~150–200 players per league per year) 
invalidated the use of static club and league values from a sin-
gle year in any data set that spanned multiple years, as the pres-
ent one did. He further argued that these conditions rendered 
the decision to use these variables a major analytic mistake, not 
a defensible analytic choice.
3. Because the majority of teams used analyses that favored 
reporting odds ratios, we chose this effect size as the com-
mon effect size. For teams that performed standard linear 
regression analyses, we used traditional conversion formulas 
(from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009) for both 
Cohen’s d and standardized regression weights (assumed to be 
correlation coefficients). Additionally, because the prevalence 
of red cards is so low, we made the “rare disease” assumption 
by assuming that the risk ratios yielded in analyses adopting 
a Poisson regression framework were fair approximations to 
odds ratios (Viera, 2008).
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